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INTEGRATING THE NON-LINE OF SIGHT LAUNCHING  





The global war on terror emphasizes the need for a weapon system that can 
improve the self-defense capability of the U.S Navy ship against small surface craft 
threats.  This MSSE Capstone Project investigated the feasibility of integrating the Non-
Line of Sight Launching System (NLOS-LS) onto U.S. Navy ships.  In particular, the 
focus of the project is on the DDG-51 class ships.  The NLOS-LS was originally 
designed to provide support to Army ground forces against over the horizon threats.  The 
U.S. Navy recognizes the prospect of this weapon in an at-sea environment.  The 
capability of the system has been proven through its developmental testing to date and 
illustrates the potential to the U.S. Navy for ship defense.  System integration involves 
incorporating a stand-alone, land-based system onto a ship with an existing shipboard 
combat system.  This report addresses the top-level integration issues, such as the 
physical installation and combat system integration, and provides recommendations 
related to some important concerns that include interface analysis, functional analysis, 
system behavior, and physical installation.  This analysis concludes with a notional 
implementation for many issues and provides a risk analysis for those issues.  It also 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Non-Line of Sight Launching System (NLOS-LS) was originally designed 
for Army use in a stand-alone, autonomous environment.  It is designed to be highly 
maneuverable and easily transported by many means such as a High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or plane, and networked with a variety of 
dissimilar sensor systems such as Electro-Optics and Infrared (EO/IR) and lasers to 
provide over-the-horizon support against advancing threats.  The U.S. Navy, recognizing 
the NLOS-LS capabilities and maritime potential, wants to take advantage of the Army’s 
initial development and install and integrate the system onto ships.  This report addresses 
the feasibility of integrating NLOS-LS onto the DDG-51 class destroyer.  Many combat 
system integration issues involving control, physical equipment locations, and sensor and 
command connections produce concerns that must be resolved.  The NLOS-LS is a 
highly modular system, which allows it to be included on ships in a cohesive manner.  
However, while placing a modular system onto a new platform is possible, it is not 
without its challenges. 
System integration activities focused on the physical location, command and 
control interfaces, radio communication, and sensor targeting data integration.  There 
were also safety aspects that were addressed which include safety to the ship and its 
equipment, danger to the crew and weapon system operators, firing zones and cutouts.  
Risks to these activities were considered and identified mandatory efforts required to 
complete the integration.  Additional issues included providing targeting data to NLOS-
LS, incorporating NLOS-LS into the threat evaluation, assigning control to weapons, and 
avoiding fratricide with existing systems.  The NLOS-LS is designed to allow two-way 
communications between a radio system and the missile.  This communication path 
includes an on-board antenna on the mast of the ship and a common data line.  This data 
line feeds the Combat Information Center (CIC) with the targeting data as well as the 
location of the missile in-flight.  The weapon assignment methodology must be updated 
to incorporate the NLOS-LS with its potential targets and reduces the probability of 
fratricide in the event of a Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) or Tomahawk missile launch. 
  1
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION / PROJECT GOALS 
With the end of the Cold War and the advent of a shift in strategy to the littoral, 
the United States Navy has need of a weapon system to improve the self defense 
capability of surface ships against multiple small surface craft attacks; an expected threat 
in the littorals.  One weapon system that has the potential to be effective in combating 
such an enemy is the NLOS-LS system, which is being employed by the United States 
Army.  This system is planned as a mission capability package for the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) and may have application in improving the self-defensive capability of the 
DDG-51 class destroyer.     
The goal of this project is to analyze the installation and integration issues 
associated with the NLOS-LS system on-board DDG-51 class destroyers.  Specifically, it 
is an analysis of the high level issues that have an impact on such an integration.  It does 
not contain material on the mechanics of such integration.  This material is covered in a 
separate report.  
 
1. Background 
The NLOS-LS program is a Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) NetFires system focused on a new non-line-of-sight missile system to be used 
by the United States Army’s Future Combat System (FCS).  On 19 March 2004, a 
combined Raytheon and Lockheed Martin team was awarded a six-year contract worth 
$1.1 billion on the System Design and Development (SDD) phase of the NLOS-LS.1  
While the NLOS-LS is already being developed for the U.S. Army, it is also being 
considered for joint service applicability with the U.S. Navy for inclusion on LCS and 
                                                 
1 Global Security Website, “Non-Line-of-Site Launch System (NLOS-LS)”, November 2005, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/net-fires.htm. access date on 6 Oct 2006. 
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other ship classes.2  The U.S. Navy recently awarded a $54.8 million contract to develop 
a NLOS-LS for the Navy LCS.  The U.S. Navy expects to build in excess of 50 such 
ships, with the first ship being the USS Freedom, which is scheduled to be commissioned 
in fiscal year 2007.  The NLOS-LS is also slated for integration on the USS 
Independence in 2008.3  It is this integration effort that gave rise to the concept of 
integrating the NLOS-LS onto the Aegis destroyer platform, which in turn resulted in this 
research project.  The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California entered 
into a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with Raytheon to 
analyze the issues associated with NLOS-LS integration onto DDG-51 class destroyers.4  
NPS was tasked to explore the issues involved with installing and integrating the NLOS-
LS system onto U.S. Navy platforms.    
The main concept behind the NLOS-LS system is a vertically launched set of 
missiles with a command and control system combined together in a stand-alone box.  It 
is designed to be platform independent, with a self-contained tactical fire control for 
remote or manned operations.  Unlike normal cannon and other rocket artillery systems 
that depend on their specific launch platform, the NLOS-LS round in its launch canister 
are a complete entity.  Figure 1 illustrates the NLOS-LS platform independence.  In 
addition, the NLOS-LS has joint service applicability with the U.S. Navy for potential 
inclusion on LCS and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) using weapon mission module 
concepts.5 
                                                 
2 Lockheed Martin Website, “NLOS-LS”, 2006, available from the internet , 
http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_products/firesupport/NLOS-LS/product-NLOS-LS.html, access 
date on 6 Oct 2006. 
3 Lockheed Martin Website, “Precision Attack Missile (PAM)”, 2004, available from the internet, 
http://www.defense-update.com/products/p/pam.htm, access date on 10 Feb 2007. 
4 Standard Navy Cooperative Research and Development Agreement Between Naval Postgraduate 
School and Raytheon Company. Agreement No. NCRADA-NPS-05-0084, 7 Jan 2006, Page 41, Section 
1.1. 
5 Lockheed Martin Website, “NLOS-LS”, 2006, available from the internet, 
http://www.missilesandfirecontrol.com/our_products/firesupport/NLOS-LS/product-NLOS-LS.html, access 
date on 6 Oct 2006. 
  3
 
Figure 1:  NLOS-LS Platform Independence6.  The flexibility of the launcher allows 
interoperability among various manned/unmanned platforms.  The system can be launch 
on a M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and deployable by 
a C130 aircraft. 
 
2. Scope of the Project 
The Statement of Work (provided as Appendix A-1) actually resulted in two 
projects.  The project described by this report was focused on the high level issues 
associated with integration on a DDG-51 class destroyer.  The second project is being 
performed by Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) and 
focused on the low level issues such as sources for power and how and where connection 
boxes will be located.   
Due to the fact that the NLOS-LS/DDG-51 study is an informal look (i.e., not 
formally sponsored by the Navy) at the issues associated with this concept, most of the 
literature available was obtained from the Internet.  Also, because this is a new concept 
there is little in the way of a literature review from which to extend the concept.   There 
                                                 
6 Netfires LLC, “Precise and Persistent Naval Fires Non-Line of Sight Launcher System (NLOS-LS)” 
Presentation, provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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is, however a solid body of material that described the integration process as well as the 
key components.  This material is introduced at the relevant points in the analysis.  
 
B. DESCRIPTION OF NLOS-LS 
The physical components of the NLOS-LS consist of a family of missiles with a 
highly deployable, platform-independent Container Launch Unit (CLU) with self-
contained tactical fire control electronics and software for remote and unmanned 
operations.  The U.S. Navy version of the NLOS-LS consists of the Precision Attack 
Missile (PAM) and the CLU.  The system, as designed today, is a box with sixteen 
sections. Fifteen of those sections hold missiles, while the last section contains the 
command and control unit.  The missiles fire from the canister like the U.S. Navy's 
Vertical Launch System (VLS). Exhaust gases follow the missile out of the top of the 
launcher, so there is little impact on the surrounding area.  Below are the system 
component descriptions of NLOS-LS. 
 
1. Container Launch Unit (CLU) 
The CLU is the physical structure that houses the missile All-Up-Rounds (AUR) 
and the Computer & Communication System (CCS). This equipment piece would be the 
physical item to be installed topside on the ship structure. The CLU contains a removable 
base assembly and a removable forklift structure for ease of maneuvering. The base unit 
is the means by which the PAM AUR and CCS communicate. This unit, once installed, 
could be removed or replaced with minimal effort. Each CLU contains fifteen PAM 
AURs and one CCS. A fully loaded unit would weigh approximately 3250 pounds and 
has dimensions of four feet by four feet by six feet.  Figure 2 shows the baseline concept 
of the CLU. 
  5
 
Figure 2:  Container Launch Unit (CLU)7.    The CLU has 15 canister missiles.  Each 
CLU is self-contained with a communication system and a launch control systems.  
 
2. Computer & Communication System (CCS) 
The CCS is the heart of the NLOS-LS.  This unit is the same size as one of the 
PAM AURs and fits into the CLU base as the AUR.  This unit contains the means by 
which the PAM AUR is fired and updates the missile while in flight.  It also provides the 
main interface to the NLOS-LS.  The Army concept incorporates power into the CCS, 
which energizes the CCS functions as well as the firing signal to the missile.  One CCS 
can interface with the fifteen PAM AURs in a single CLU.   
 
3. Precision Attack Missile (PAM) 
The PAM is a low-cost direct attack missile that is 7 inches in diameter, 60 inches 
long and weighs 117.5 pounds.  It has a boost sustain rocket motor, dual-mode uncooled 
infrared/semi-active laser seeker, and a multi-mode warhead. Two-way data links on the 
PAM allow the missile to be re-tasked in-flight and to downlink images of targets.  
Figure 3 shows a pictorial description of the PAM. 
 
                                                 
7 Netfires LLC, “Precise and Persistent Naval Fires Non-Line of Sight Launcher System (NLOS-LS)” 
Presentation, provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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Figure 3:  Precision Attack Missile (PAM)8.  The PAM consists of a variable thrust 
motor, dual-mode precision uncooled infrared/semi-active laser seeker and a large 
multimode warhead effective against both moving and stationary targets.  
 
The PAM consists of four major sections: seeker, payload, guidance electronics, 
and propulsion and control. The Seeker section holds the impact fuze and Infrared/Semi-
active Laser (IR/SAL) seeker. Impact fuze ignites the multimode warhead on impact. 
Figure 4 shows the seeker of PAM in U.S. Navy concepts.  The Payload section consists 
of the GPS Antenna and Multimode Warhead.  The Guidance Electronics section house 
all electronic communication, guidance, and detonation. The last section of the PAM 
provides the propulsion and control.  
The weapon system uses a "soft launch concept," meaning that the missile does 
not encounter the high g-forces and acceleration that artillery shells and most missiles 
                                                 
8 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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experience when traveling at high speeds.9  The launch impact to the deck of the ship can 
be considered to be much less than other missile systems on-board.10  Initially, there is 
just enough force to get the missile out of the box and move it upward. 
 
Figure 4:  U.S. Navy PAM Seeker Capability11.  The PAM consists of a variable thrust 
motor, dual-mode precision uncooled infrared/semi-active laser seeker and a large 
multimode warhead effective against both moving and stationary targets. UCIIR begins 
acquisition process at 4.4 nautical miles. 
 
4. System Performance 
Currently, the NLOS-LS is in the System Development and Demonstration phase 
for the Army. Prior to this, the DARPA program completed a successful flight test 
program. The successful completion of the guided flight-tests show that PAM has the 
capability to be used against moving and stationary heavy armor and soft targets ranging 
from 0.5 to 40 kilometers. Moreover, during testing the PAM’s ability to receive target 
location updates while in flight was validated. The PAM Semi-Active Laser (SAL)/ 
Infrared (IR)/Moving Target Indicator (MTI) seeker  demonstrated the capability to 
search and track land and sea targets during the terminal portion of the flight and make 
                                                 
9  Global Security Website, “Non-Line-of-Site Launch System (NLOS-LS)”, November 2005, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/net-fires.htm, access date on 6 Oct 2006. 
10 Netfires LLC, “Precise and Persistent Naval Fires Non-Line of Sight Launcher System (NLOS-
LS)” Presentation, provided by Raytheon for the project. 
11 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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final corrections for the PAM to hit the target during DARPA missile tests, as shown in 
Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5:  DARPA Tests12.  Multiple tests were conducted to illustrate the seeker 
capability to search and track land targets (T-90 tank) and sea targets (Riverine Assault 
Craft). 
 
The PAM is armed with a large multimode warhead and is used primarily as an 
anti-armor weapon. The warhead consists of a stainless steel case filled with explosive. 
The warhead case incorporates the joints for mechanical connection to the Seeker Section 
and Guidance Section. When assembled, the warhead is 8 inches in length. The warhead 
houses the safety arming device and a fuze booster. It utilizes an initiation system 
compatible with the explosive output. The fuze booster starts the detonation of the 
warhead. When detonated, the warhead expands and breaks into controlled shape 
fragments. Figure 6 illustrates the description and effectiveness of the baseline warhead 
for the PAM. 
                                                 
12 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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Figure 6:  PAM Baseline Warhead13.  The front of the warhead attaches to the 
guidance section, the aft attaches to the seeker section. This warhead consist of PBXN-9 
billet explosive, copper liner, aluminum retaining ring, syntac 350 wave shaper, 1020 
steel body, ULTEM IM FI Barrier, ULTEM Boat tail, Aluminum ESAD fixture, Nylon 
PIC spacer, and CRES/ PBX-5 PIC. 
 
The U.S. Navy conducted a test with the PAM warhead against an unconventional 
small surface craft.  The test was conducted with a Riverine Assault Craft (RAC) 
 as a target.  This aluminum hull craft is 9 foot wide, 35 foot long with a twin engine and 
a weapons station on-board.  Figure 7 shows images of the target after the impact of the 
PAM baseline warhead.  The hull damage on the left side was a 36” tear in the hull skin 
and the right side panel bowed out 8”.  As evidenced by the pictures, the relatively small 
PAM missile generated considerable damage. However, this was a static test with the 
warhead mounted in the boat.  
 
                                                 
13 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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Figure 7:  U.S. Navy PAM Test Results7.  A PAM baseline warhead was place inside 
the RAC to test the effectiveness and lethality of the PAM 
  
The performance of PAM can be enhanced by use of a fragmentation warhead 
operating in an air burst mode. Each warhead would generate approximately 9,077 of 
high velocity fragments dispersed over a lethal area approximately of 1600m2 giving it 
the capability to engage multiple targets. Appendix B shows the calculation for this PAM 
baseline warhead. The scenario of multiple small boats arriving in a chevron formation 
illustrates the overall engagement capabilities. The NLOS-LS system response against 
these simultaneous threats is shown in Figure 8.  The NLOS-LS can assign each PAM to 
specific threats during target acquisition.  The threat formation is nine targets in a 
chevron formation with each threat spaced 30 degrees apart from each other. 
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Figure 8:  NLOS-LS Threat Methodology14.  The PAM Response illustrates the pattern 
that each PAM can utilize each assigned target. 
 
 
Figure 9 presents the results of 15 PAM missiles used against 60 targets arriving 
in multiple chevron formations or 1500 and 3000 meter search ranges.  The probability of 
kill remains relatively high, despite the swarm attack against a single ship.  The analytic 
results are that the integration of the NLOS-LS onto U.S Navy ships will improve the 
surface ship’s defense capability. 
 
(solid lines represent mean; dotted lines represent 1 sigma error) 
Figure 9:  Single Container Launch Unit (CLU) vs. 60 Targets14.  The two graphs are 
the results from a Raytheon presentation LCS versus 60 targets. 
                                                 
14 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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C. CONCEPT OF OPERATION (CONOPS) 
The operational concept of the NLOS-LS system is to provide precision non-line 
of sight fire for ships against unconventional small surface forces. The NLOS-LS is 
designed to overcome large Target Location Errors (TLEs) which allows it to 
differentiate between the actual location of the target versus the expected location. The 
PAM has laser-designated and autonomous operation modes and transmits near-real-time 
information in the form of target imagery prior to impact.  In addition, NLOS-LS has the 
capability to kill hard targets with armored plating and soft targets with light armor that 
can be both moving or stationary out to forty kilometers.  A secondary goal is to provide 
the U.S. Navy with rapid response and lethality in packages requiring, fewer personnel, 
less logistical support, and lower life cycle costs. The idea of this joint procurement of 
NLOS-LS by the Army and Navy is to provide better interoperability, command and 
control, and mutual support between land and sea forces within littoral regions.15   
Below are descriptions of both the Army and Navy CONOPS.  The Army 
CONOPS is provided as a baseline.  Because the U.S. Navy is leveraging off of the 
Army’s system, the Navy CONOPS is similar but modified for a maritime application. 
 
1. U.S. Army NLOS-LS CONOPS 
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS) is integrating NLOS-LS into different 
launch configurations. The NLOS-LS unique configuration allows it to be mounted on a 
HMMWV, truck, or placed on the ground.  NLOS-LS is designed to provide responsive, 
networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of armored, lightly armored and 
other stationary and moving targets during day/night and near all weather conditions.  
The NLOS-LS provides support to ground forces, particularly in the conduct of extended-
range and non-line-of-sight engagements. Figure 10 shows the Army’s concept of 
operations for the NLOS-LS precision engagement capability. 
 
                                                 
15 Emerson, Laflamme, and Cunningham. NLOS Systems for the modular and Future Forces, Field 
Artillery, Nov-Dec 2004, page 7-11. 
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Figure 10:  OV-1 Diagram for U.S. Army16.  The Army concept of operation showed 
that the CLU is platform independent and the control unit can be located inside a truck or 
a HMMWV. 
 
2. U.S. Navy NLOS-LS CONOPS 
The U.S. Navy operational concept is to provide precision non-line of sight fire 
against unconventional small surface forces. The U.S. Navy’s general approach to 
countering the unconventional small surface craft threat would involve the combined use 
of a manned helicopter or UAV as an off-board platform to provide target bearing and 
launch detection, thereby increasing the forward-looking capability of the ship while the 
helicopter is conducting other operations or is unable to engage the target itself.  A 
general overview of the NLOS-LS Navy operational concept for the offensive strike and 
defensive layers needed for the unconventional small surface craft scenario is reflected in 
the OV-1 Diagram, shown in Figure 11. 
 
                                                 
16  Raytheon website, “Non-Line of Sight-Launch System (NLOS-LS) Product Data sheet”, 2006, 
available from the internet, 
http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_055756.pdf, access 
date on 6 Oct 2006. 
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Figure 11:  OV-1 Diagram for U.S. Navy17.  During the PAM in flight, the PAM sends 
health and status, and battle damage imagery back to the platform.  The MH-60 provides 
target location back to the platform. 
 
The goal of NLOS-LS is to provide a commander with rapid fire support on 
surface targets, given the appropriate real-time sensor data and control.  The PAM is a 
direct attack missile suitable for use against moving and stationary targets at ranges from 
zero to forty kilometers.  The missile includes a networked data link that provides in-
flight updates with sea, ground and airborne sensor nodes and has a multi-mode warhead 
designed to be used against both hard and soft targets18. Retargeted missions are 
typically planned and executed in tactical situations against emerging targets. A 
retargeted mission occurs as a result of revised tactical priorities or from updated tactical 
                                                 
17  Raytheon website, “Non-Line of Sight-Launch System (NLOS-LS) Product Data sheet”, 2006, 
available from the internet, 
http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_055756.pdf, access 
date on 24 Oct 2006. 
18  Spacewar website, “NetFires Conducts Navy Ballistic Flight Test For NLOS-LS Missile”, Staff 
Writer, 29 March 2006, available from the internet, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/NetFires_Conducts_Navy_Ballistic_Flight_Test_For_NLOS_LS_Missil
e.html, access date on 6 Oct 2006. 
  15
information. This information is normally developed using target information provided 
by external sources.  The “in-flight retargeting” capability redirects a PAM missile from 
an existing action point to a new aim point.19 
                                                 
































This section lays the groundwork for integrating the NLOS-LS onto the DDG-51 
class destroyer. The Vee-Model illustrated in Figure 12 was used as a general systems 
engineering approach and adapted to fit this project.20  After understanding the 
customer’s needs as the input to the process, an approach was developed to facilitate the 
integration into the combat system and physical installation.  The steps in green shown in 
Figure 12 represent this integration and installation effort.  In addition, the current 
integration effort for the LCS was studied and evaluated for applicability to the DDG-51 
problem.  The take away was the potential value of the Module Engagement Control 
(MEC) as an interface between the AEGIS weapon system and the NLOS-LS.  All other 
development considerations were specific to the LCS only.   
Next, the DDG-51 ship systems were researched.  In order to install and integrate 
the NLOS-LS, one must know what already exists.  These systems were then identified 
and researched.  In general, NLOS-LS requires sensor inputs, communication links, data 
interfaces, and locations for the system components.  With the ship support elements 
identified, a list of integration issues was developed.    
This was followed by an analysis on how to install and integrate the NLOS-LS.  
The analysis is presented in Section III. Section IV provides the recommendations and 
outlines future work and analysis that need to be completed. 
 
                                                 
20  Buede, Dennis M.  The Engineering Design of Systems- Models and Methods, New York, NY:  
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2000, pg 8. 
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Figure 12:  System Engineering Vee Model21. This widely used model provided a 
general systems engineering approach and was adapted to fit this project. 
 
The Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) Manual22 is a guide by which to 
implement Proposed Military Improvements (PMI) on-board U.S. Navy ships. With this 
as a guide the Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) in Figure 13 steps through the 
sequence necessary to install and integrate the NLOS-LS.  This approach was chosen 
since it has been proven to be mature and has been used at Port Hueneme for past U.S. 
Navy systems.  Most of the analysis conducted focused heavily on blocks 1.0 through 
5.0.  The remaining blocks cover the physical installation, which is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
                                                 
21 Forsberg K., & Mooz, H., The Relationship Of Systems Engineering To The Project Cycle, 
Engineering Management Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3 September 1992, pp. 36-43. 
22  Fleet Modernization Program Management and Operations Manual – Revision 2, Commander, 
NAVSEA Systems Command, 10 June 2002. 
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Figure 13:  NLOS-LS Installation and Integration Functional Flow Block Diagram 
(FFBD).  This FFBD steps through the functions necessary to install and integrate the 
NLOS-LS onto a ship. 
 
B. LCS RELATED WORK 
The U.S. Navy has shown its interest in extending the potential of NLOS-LS to 
other platforms as a result of the planned integration into LCS.  LCS is a member of the 
family of future surface combatants and plays an integral role in the SEA SHIELD 
component of SEA POWER 21, which is the projection of defensive power from the sea.   
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The first fielding date for the NLOS-LS for the Navy is projected to be in July 2007 on-
board the LCS Flight 0.23   
The integration of NLOS-LS into the LCS surface warfare (SuW) mission 
package testing occurred between August 2005 and February 2006. A series of warhead 
characterization tests were conducted from August to September of 2005 to assess the 
damage of the PAM surrogate warhead against test targets in littoral environments.  At 
the end of September 2005, the tests were conducted to demonstrate and evaluate the 
Semi-Active Laser (SAL)/Uncooled Infrared (IR) Imager, Real-Time Address 
Translation Agent (ATA) and handoff to an IR Tracker, and Moving Target Indicator 
(MTI) mode of operation of the PAM seeker in a naval littoral environment. On 17 
November 2005, a set of tests demonstrated the PAM rocket motor’s ability to safely 
extinguish on command by rapidly decreasing the internal motor pressure to prevent 
propellant burn and keep the motor from reigniting. The final integration tests were 
conducted on 16 February 2006. These tests showed the safe vertical launch and fly-out 
dynamics of the PAM from the launcher in motion.  Also demonstrated during these tests 
was the integration of the CLU simulator with the prototype naval command and control 
(C2) system. 24  
The results of these tests successfully illustrated the NLOS-LS capability to 
provide beyond line of sight precision attacks against LCS threats in the littorals. These 
results can be used show how NLOS-LS would enhance the capabilities of the DDG-51 
class ships.  This study will concentrate on discussing the issues involved with physically 
integrating the NLOS-LS system onto the DDG 51 class.  Unlike the LCS class ships 
which are still in the design and production phases, the DDG-51 class ships which are 
already designed, built, and commissioned will have a different set of integration issues 
that must be resolved.  This means that it is much more difficult to add systems onto the 
DDG-51 class than it is for the LCS class. 
                                                 
23  Raytheon Missile Systems, NLOS-LS Integrated Logistics Strategy Report Rev. A (Document No. 
2259985), Tucson, AZ, September 2005, pg 2. 
24 Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren Division), “NLOS-LS, 30mm Gun Weapons System, and 
SUW Mission Module, Test and Evaluation Status and Path Forward”, presentation, provided by Paul 
Lefeave, March 17, 2006. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. INTEGRATION ISSUES 
The integration issues from the CRADA in Appendix A and system integration 
analysis that need resolution before installation onto naval ship platforms are listed 
below: 
Combat System Integration Physical Installation 
• Interface analysis to existing ship systems 
• Interfaces analysis internal to NLOS-LS 
• NLOS-LS functional analysis 
• NLOS-LS system behavior 
• Location/Footprint of NLOS-LS system 
components 
• Blockage Zones 
• Blast Effects 
• Environmental Effects 
• Stabilization 
• Electromagnetic Environmental Effects  
• Radar Cross Section 
• Fratricide 
• Safety 
• CIC Integration 
• NLOS-LS physical cabling connections to 
include power, ship navigation, alignment 
data, command and control, and 
communications (both internal and external) 
 
B. COMBAT SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The ship has an existing organization and framework and it is necessary to 
understand how different components work together.  Figure 14 was developed to 
illustrate the interfaces involved with the NLOS-LS system.  This entity model provided 
a generic picture of how the different DDG-51 systems and NLOS-LS components 
interact with each other and served as a background for the analysis.  From here, the 




Figure 14:  NLOS-LS Entity Model.  This model gives a visualization of the interfaces 
with NLOS-LS and the ship framework. 
 
1. NLOS-LS Interfaces 
In order to integrate NLOS-LS, the following combat system elements need to be 
accounted for: 
• AN/SPY-1D Radar 
• AN/SPS-67 Radar 
• Command and Decision System (C&D) 
• Weapons Control System (WCS) 
• Gun Fire Control System 
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The AWS element interface illustrated in Figure 15 shows a notional concept of 












































































Figure 15:  Aegis Weapon Interfaces.  The AWS element interface shows a notional 
concept of how NLOS-LS fits in the complement of weapon systems in the Aegis suite. 
There are three sources within the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) that can provide 
targeting data for NLOS-LS: 
1. Cooperative Engagement Planner (CEP):  Requires an extra stage to interface and 
perform data translation. 
2. Weapon Control System (WCS):  Entails extensive integration with the existing 
weapon system data sources on-board the DDG-51. 
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3. Command & Decision (C&D) Data line:  Taps into available information, in an 
appropriate format, and has an appropriate bandwidth. 
 
The Command and Decision (C&D) element is the core of the AWS as shown in 
Figure 16.    It is this targeting data source that makes Aegis capable of simultaneous 
operations against the following multi-mission threats: anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-
submarine warfare.  
 
 
Figure 16:  NLOS-LS Overview Diagram.  This diagram was created to show the 
system element interfaces between NLOS-LS and the AWS. 
 
Figure 16 drills down one level deeper and looks at the system-to-system level 
interfaces between NLOS-LS and AWS.  The NLOS-LS interfaces are defined as 
follows:  
• NLOS-LS to AWS – provides two-way data communication from the 
AWS to the console in CIC. 
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• NLOS-LS CIC console to CLU – provides a two-way interface to the 
CLU, to control and monitor missile launch and support maintenance and 
training operations. 
• CLU to Radio – provides a two-way interface to receive and transmit 
communication information. 
• Radio to PAM – provides updated targeting data to in-flight missile and 
missile position data while in flight. 
• Organic and Non-Organic Sensors track data to AWS – provides new 
target location or updated target information to ship. 
• Ship Systems to CLU – provides NLOS-LS with data for system 
operations. 
 
The NLOS-LS, as integrated into the DDG-51 class destroyer, consists of the 
following subsystems: CLU, PAM, NAVSSI, WSN, Radio System, and NLOS-LS 
Engagement Planner. NLOS-LS receives and processes calls for fire and mission data 
from C&D and provides monitoring and control of the missile launch sequence for the 
PAM. The CLU provides two-way communication to the PAM via the NLOS Radio to 
provide real-time targeting data. In addition, the CLU provides the support for the 
operation by preparing the launch of the PAM. The CLU provides the interface to the 
fifteen PAMs. The PAM receives targeting information prior to launch. While in-flight, 
the PAM can be updated and respond to an updated target location.  Furthermore, prior to 
impact, the PAM can transmit near-real-time target imagery data back to the ship. 
The system interfaces to the NLOS-LS provide the necessary data in order for 
NLOS-LS to function.  Below are descriptions of the different systems that NLOS-LS 
may interface with. 
a. Organic and Off-Board Sensors 
DDG-51 class destroyers are equipped with several organic and off-board 
sensors such as AN/SPY-1D Radar, AN/SPS-67 Radar, the Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC), MH-60R LAMPS MK III Seahawk helicopter, and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) such as Fire Scout.  These sensors provide the DDG-51 class destroyer 
with the ability to search, detect, and track targets with various ranges.  The capabilities 
of these sensors are as follows: 
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• AN/SPY-1D Radar system is used as a primary air and surface radar for 
the Aegis Combat System for the DDG-51 class ships.  It is a multi-
function phased-array radar capable of search, automatic detection, 
transition to track, tracking of air and surface targets, and missile 
engagement support.  Its use as a sensor will be restricted to the radar 
horizon.  By using a simple computation from the EW Handbook25 (see 
Appendix D), and assuming a radar height of 60 feet and a target height of 
5 feet, the SPY radar horizon is 22.7 kilometers.  Because NLOS-LS has a 
maximum range of forty kilometers, the AN/SPY-1D has limited utility. 
 
• AN/SPS-67 is a short-range, two-dimensional, surface-search/navigation 
radar system that provides highly accurate surface and limited low-flyer 
detection and tracking capabilities.  The AN/SPS-67 provides excellent 
performance in rain and sea clutter, and is useful in harbor navigation, 
since the AN/SPS-67 is capable of detecting buoys and small obstructions 
without difficulty.  The transmitter/receiver is capable of operation in a 
long (1.0 sec), medium (0.25 msec), or short (0.10 msec) pulse mode to 
enhance radar performance for specific operational or tactical situations.  
The AN/SPS-67 is located at the top of the forward mast and has an 
operating range of 35 nm or 65km.26 
 
• Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a system that allows the 
sharing of sensor data among ships.  CEC is capable of using a line-of-
sight data distribution system to transmit sensor data from individual ships 
of a Battle Group to other ships in the group.  With these capabilities, an 
individual ship can launch an anti-air missile at a threat aircraft or anti-
                                                 
25 Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Electronic Warfare and Radar Systems Engineering 
Handbook, NAWCWPNS TP 8347: Naval Air Systems Command, 1 April 1997. 
26 Harpoonhq Website, “CG 16 Leahy (1987/NTU)”, 1987, available from the internet, 
http://www.harpoonhq.com/encyclopedia/HTML_Files/Ships/249.htm, access date on 4 March 2007. 
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ship cruise missile within its engagement envelope, based on track data 
relayed to it by another ship.  It is reasonable that this system may have 
utility as a sensor source for NLOS-LS.  A detailed evaluation is 
warranted but is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
• MH-60R helicopters counter the anti-surface threat by serving as a 
forward-looking, off-board system.  The MH-60R, when configured for 
the anti-surface mission, has the capability to counter surface threats.  To 
locate, shoot, and survive against such threats, the MH-60R will be 
equipped with a multi-mode radar, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) 
sensor, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) system, a retrievable, low 
frequency sonar with advanced signal processing, and an integrated self-
defense system.  With the enhanced command and control and situational 
awareness provided by its Link 4, 11, and 16 interfaces, the armed MH-
60R can be a viable data source and provide initial and follow-up threat 
updates to execute far-ranging search and destroy missions.  Facilitated by 
a 3.5 hours maximum time on station, the MH-60R will be capable of 
reaching ranges at which surface threats are projected to be located.27 
 
 
Figure 17:  MH-60R.  MH-60R helicopters counter the anti-surface threat by serving as 
a forward-looking, off-board system. 
                                                 
27  Deagel Website, “MH-60R STRIKEHAWK-MULTI-MISSION NAVAL HELICOPTER, USA”, 
2006, available from the internet, http://www.deagel.com/pandora/index.aspx?p=pm00101010, access date 
on 6 Oct 2006. 
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• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are used for both attack and 
reconnaissance missions.  It helps commanders at different echelons to 
know what is on or approaching the battlefield before their forces get 
there, and employ forces and weapon systems more efficiently as the 
result of precision targeting and Battle Damage Assessment information.28  
UAVs are potential off-board sensors but further technological 
development is required before they are a feasible data source. 
 
NLOS-LS requires a sensor that can provide the ship with the capability to search, 
detect, and track numerous targets simultaneously over the horizon.  UAVs can 
potentially provide the forward-looking target data for over the horizon threats.   
b. Navigation Sensor System Interface (NAVSSI) 
The NAVSSI system consolidates all navigation data from the Inertial 
Navigation System (INS) AN/WSN-7.  NAVSSI also receives Global Positioning Signal 
(GPS) satellite data for ship position.  This information is then distributed to combat 
systems throughout the ship.  It currently aids weapon systems, such as Tomahawk, in the 
location and acquisition of target tracks to be designated.  Due to the PAM already 
having its own GPS information, NAVSSI could provide a redundant source in the event 
that information is lost or inaccurate. 
c. Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) 
For planning purposes, the GCCS-M can provide C&D with a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) of the current situation.  This COP allows the user to see all 
friendly, neutral, and hostile tracks. The C&D can utilize GCCS-M to receive, process, 
display, and manage data on the readiness of neutral, friendly, and hostile forces.  It also 
can provide a tactical picture to plan and help execute NLOS-LS missions.   
d. Inertial Navigation System (INS) AN/WSN-7 
                                                 
28  FAS Website, “UAV Annual Report FY1996”, 6 November 1996, available from the internet, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/uav96/page35.html, access date on 8 Nov 2006. 
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The INS AN/WSN-7 is a navigation system that continuously updates the 
ship’s navigation data by referencing the meridian and zenith.  Duplicate systems on 
ships generally provide the necessary redundancy to provide ship information such as 
roll, pitch, and heading.  This system is another alternative for the CLU to receive 
information to pass to the PAM.  The benefit of using GPS data is in the ability of 
operating worldwide with no time-delay in updates. 
e. Cryptographic Key (CYZ-10) 
The CYZ-10 is currently used to load cryptographic keys into different 
systems like Tomahawk and the KG-84 communication security device.  The NLOS-LS 
Radio could use this cryptographic key to load two weeks of the most current GPS update 
information into the NLOS-LS unit.  Two weeks of cryptographic data are needed in the 
event that the system is operational between two consecutive weeks as the cryptographic 
keys used to access GPS satellites changes weekly. The NLOS-LS can use the GPS data 
to provide missile position updates to the CCS.   NLOS-LS can download the GPS 
cryptographic data to the missile prior to launch so that the missile’s GPS receiver can 
acquire GPS data. During a missile power-up, the NLOS–LS can load the GPS data into 
the CCS for missile alignment.  Further research needs to be done to determine the 
feasibility of using the CYZ-10.  Another solution would be to use the cryptographic key 
planned for the LCS integration.  No specific key has been identified as part of the LCS 
development, just that one would be used. 
 
f. Module Engagement Control (MEC) 
The MEC is currently planned for the LCS design and does not currently 
exist.  It is envisioned that the MEC will have the capability to task NLOS-LS or other 
weapon systems to engage hostile targets.  The concept calls for the MEC to contain 
targeting data from internal or external sensors, as well as to integrate tactical 
information, mission planning data, weapon scheduling and engagement data. 
Figure 18 demonstrates the steps to schedule an engagement in order to 
select the proper weapon system and be designated in control.  This is a process to ensure 
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that all other weapon systems on-board will not engage at the same time as the NLOS-
LS. This prevents the possibility of a mid-air collision or destruction of the PAM during 
its initial launch stage.  It also ensures that the NLOS-LS is in the “make ready” state to 
Aegis and the other weapon systems.  The MEC concept could be integrated with the 
C&D of the AWS.  This concept of integrating and using the MEC on Aegis ships is 
another area requiring further analysis. 
 
Figure 18:  Module Engagement Control FFBD.  In order to schedule an engagement, 
the proper weapon system must be selected and designated to be in control. 
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Pre-launch communications will be performed by a hard-wired Ethernet 
connection between the CLU and command and control.  The original design for NLOS-
LS incorporates the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5 for in-flight missile 
communication.  At the time of this report, the JTRS radios are not technically mature 
and need more time before fielding29.  The proposed interim solution is to utilize a NLOS 
Radio for post-launch communications, operating at a maximum link burst data rate of 
2642 kbps.30  The range of the NLOS Radio is dependent upon the height of the PAM.  
Figure 19 shows the results for the maximum range calculation of the NLOS-LS Radio, 
with an assumed antenna height of 100 feet. 
( )HtHrD *2*233.1 +=  
Ht = Height of Antenna (in feet) 
Hr = Height of PAM in Flight (in feet) 





Maximum range of the radio 
(miles) 
100 ft 500 ft 61 mi 
100 ft 1000 ft 78 mi 
100 ft 1500 ft 92 mi 
100 ft 2000 ft 103 mi 
Figure 19: Maximum range of the NLOS-LS Radio.  The line-of-sight of the radio 
from an antenna mounted 100ft from the deck of a DDG-51 class destroyer to an antenna 
on a PAM in flight. The curvature of the earth limits the range of the radio. Due to the 
receiver sensitivity, transmitter power, and antenna efficiency the actual range of the 
radio is usually lower.31 
 
The antenna associated with the NLOS Radio will provide 360 degrees of 
azimuth coverage and can handle multiple PAMs in flight.  Figure 20 shows a notional 
use case diagram of how the communications paths flow. 
                                                 
29 Government Accountability Office, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, Restructured JTRS Program 
Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO Report 05-669, June 2005. 
30 Performance Specification For The Non-Line of Sight - Launch System (NLOS-LS) Precision Attack 
Missile (PAM) Radio, Raytheon Company, 31 January 2006. 
31  Pacific Crest Corporation Application Note, “UHF/VHF Range Calculations”, 2007, available 
from the internet, www.paccrst.com/downloads/application_notes/AppNote_UHF_VHF_Calc.pdf, access 
date on 6 Mar 2007. 
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Figure 20:  Network Communication Use Case Diagram.  This is a notional use case 
diagram of how the communications paths flow.32 
 
g. Combat information Center (CIC) 
The CIC is the tactical center of the DDG. This space is used to collect, 
manage, present, evaluate and disseminate the Command and Decision (C&D) 
information for the use by the Weapons Officer (WEPS), Executive Officer (XO), or 
Commanding Officer (CO).   
• Multi Function Console (MFC) 
The existing NLOS-LS controls could be migrated to a MFC to provide a 
tactical picture for the Strike Officer (STRIKE) and WEPS to see.  The previously 
mentioned MEC functionality could also be integrated into a MFC.  The console would 
have one interface to the C&D and internally with the NLOS Engagement Planner (NEP).  
                                                 
32 Performance Specification For The Non-Line of Sight - Launch System (NLOS-LS) Precision Attack 
Missile (PAM) Radio, Raytheon Company, 31 January 2006. 
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Further research would need to be conducted for the integration issues of this particular 
configuration.   
• Aegis Target Data Line 
The best option for target sensor data will be through the C&D data line in 
the CIC. This data line provides targeting data to NLOS-LS from the Aegis Weapon 
System.  Dependent upon the operational mode of Tactical or Training, NLOS-LS 
utilizes information of a pending launch of the PAM.  The C&D in CIC prioritizes and 
designates NLOS-LS with the other weapon systems.  For security purposes, the CO can 
lockout an impending launch with his launch inhibit key. 
 
• WCS Scheduling / Doctrine 
The WCS schedules engagements upon receipt of direction from the C&D 
in a manner designed to eliminate fratricide. The priorities set by the WCS are for Anti-
Air Warfare (AAW), STRIKE warfare, and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The highest 
priority is AAW which uses the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and the 
Standard Missile. Next would be STRIKE, which uses Tomahawk. Finally, the last in 
priority would be ASW that utilizes the Mk-46 torpedo.  This priority dictates what 
weapon system would be the first to execute and is based on the response required to 
engage the threat (e.g. AAW threats require fast response weapons).  As an example, a 
strike engagement is planned and the Tomahawk element has control of the launcher and 
has missiles powered up while threats are present.  If an AAW emerges, the missile fire 
control element would be activated and immediately lockout the launcher, bringing all of 
the Tomahawk missiles to a hold fire state until control is released back to Tomahawk.  
The same logic can be applied to NLOS-LS and priorities would need to be determined in 
the C&D. Since NLOS-LS is a Surface Warfare (SuW) weapon, it is recommended that 
the priority fall between AAW and STRIKE as seen in Figure 21.  The reasoning is based 
on the required response to engage the threat.  Surface engagement timelines are slightly 
slower (in minutes) than the AAW/engagement timeline (in seconds) of Standard Missile 
and other systems.  In this case the WCS would need to schedule engagements to 
eliminate fratricide between Standard Missile, Tomahawk, PAM, and CIWS due to the 
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general proximity to the AFT VLS launcher.  The location of the NLOS-LS launcher is 
discussed later in this report. 
 
 
Figure 21:  Priority Doctrine.  Since NLOS-LS is a Surface Warfare (SuW) weapon, it 
is recommended that the priority fall between AAW and STRIKE. 
 
2. NLOS-LS Functional Analysis 
The combat system interface requirements of the NLOS-LS, as outlined in the 
previous section, can now be functionally integrated.  Using the Hatley-Pirbhai PSARE 
(Process for System Architecture and Requirements Engineering) process, the following 
series of architecture diagrams illustrate the structure of how NLOS-LS will be 
integrated.33  The required functions, shown in Figure 22, illustrate in what manner 
NLOS-LS must interact with systems external to its boundaries.  These requirements will 
be addressed through the Architecture Flow Context Diagram (AFCD) and assorted 
Architecture Flow Diagrams (AFDs) which cover the main components of the launching 
system. 
                                                 
33 Hatley, Derek, Peter Hruschka, and Imtiaz Pirbhai.  Process for System Architecture and 














Figure 22:  Required NLOS-LS Architecture Functions.  The required functions 
illustrate in what manner NLOS-LS must interact with systems external to its boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 23 was developed to map the NLOS-LS component into the Hatley-Pirbhai 
paradigm.  This places the data flows between components in context and allows the 






















































Figure 23:  AFCD NLOS-LS.  NLOS-LS receives and processes data from the Radio, 
C&D, WSN, NAVSSI, and the consoles. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 23, NLOS-LS processes data from the Radio, C&D, 
WSN, NAVSSI, and the consoles. When NLOS-LS processes the data, it is passed to the 
CLU for storage and assignment by the Computer & Communication System, which 
sends the signal to the PAM.  The system as envisioned has the capability to perform a 
built-in-test and provide information of any failures in the system and its interfaces. A 
Power-On Built-In Test (BIT) is automatically executed when power is applied to the 
system.  Additionally, NLOS-LS has the capability to be operated and viewed from the 




a. AFD 0 NLOS Engagement Planner (NEP) 
Figure 24 shows the top-level architecture flow diagram for the NLOS-LS.  
It includes the major components of the weapon system, which include the C&D data 
from CIC, the control panel used to operate the system, the CLU, PAM, and the Power-
On BIT function.  The C&D is connected to the NEP via the MEC in CIC to provide the 
engagement data.  The operator interfaces with the system through the control panel in 
CIC.  The NLOS Radio allows communication with the in-flight PAM and off-board 
sensors.  The CLU serves as the interface to the PAM missiles and performs the firing 
sequence after receiving a valid target engagement.  The Power-On BIT verifies proper 
operation of the system itself prior to entering any operational mode. The NEP is a 










































Figure 24:  AFD 0 NLOS-LS NEP.  The top-level architecture flow diagram for the 
NLOS-LS includes the major components of the weapon system. 
The NEP ensures the external inputs such as tracks, almanac data, cryptographic data, 
and INS are usable. When the PAM is in-flight, the NEP processes data and sends 
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updates to the PAM via the NLOS Radio. The NEP has the capability to process 
incoming target locations and preplanned mission and verification codes sent from 
another platform or a forward observer. Thus, NLOS-LS will have the capability to select 
a missile from a certain cell and power up that particular PAM. 
b. AFD 1 CLU  
The CLU acts as a communication node via a direct-wired Ethernet 
interface with engagement data from the NEP and updating the Radio and PAM, as seen 
in Figure 25.  The CLU performs the missile assignment and the initial launch of the 



































Figure 25:  AFD 1 CLU and CCS.  The CLU acts as a communication node via a 
direct-wired Ethernet interface with engagement data from the NEP and updating the 
Radio and PAM. 
The CLU currently has the capability to receive health and status updates from the PAM 
via the NLOS Radio and send it to the NEP. Moreover, the C&D needs doctrine safety 
measures as mentioned previously to ensure a firing lockout during the firing of another 
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weapon system or from turning the Commanding Officer’s (CO) Fire Inhibit Switch.  
During system power up, a built-in test is performed to ensure proper operation of the 
launcher.  If selected, the WSN can provide the CLU with alignment data, which will 
align the system relative to the ship’s position and the particular location of the launcher 
on the ship. Once the alignment is complete and the data is loaded into the PAM, the 
operator releases the PAM by sending a fire signal to the selected PAM. 
c. AFD 2 PAM 
Proper functionality of the PAM is a mission-critical process, therefore, 
the PAM must maintain constant communication with the Radio and CLU to ensure that 
the PAM can transition to flight and intercept its target as seen in Figure 26.  When in-
flight, the PAM sends health status updates back to the NEP.  The operator monitors the 
PAM in-flight and is alerted of battle damage imagery or complications during flight.  A 
new intercept point is sent to the in-flight PAM from the NEP if organic or off-board 
sensors detect new target coordinates to engage or updated locations of existing targets.  
This real-time update affords a capable missile with quick reaction times. 
d. AFD 3 NLOS Communications 
The NLOS-LS will establish communications with the PAM via the 
NLOS-LS Radio as seen in Figure 27.  This allows continuous tracking of the PAM after 
it has been launched from the ship.  The NLOS-LS platform will utilize a communication 
link between the radio and the C&D via the NEP for updated target information.  This 
updated target data can originate from one of two locations: organic, on-board sensors or 
an off-board location.  The PAM sends a health status update at interval times back to the 
NEP through the NLOS Radio to report its latest information.  This allows the PAM to 
update its mission after its launch in case of higher priority threats or a change in the 































Figure 26:  AFD 2 PAM.  The PAM must maintain constant communication with the 










Figure 27:  AFD 3 Radio.  The NLOS-LS communicates with the PAM via the NLOS-




3. NLOS-LS System Behavior 
a. Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) 
Given the coherent operational picture that can be created via organic 
sensors, off-board sensors, and networked intelligence feeds, a notional implementation 
of NLOS-LS allows the initiation and launch of offensive operations to destroy potential 
threats. Initially, the AN/SPY-lD and AN/SPS-67 radar systems perform the search, 
detection, transition to track, and tracking of surface targets for non-over-the-horizon 
threats.  For an over the horizon scenario the MH-60, UAV, or other surface platform 
would provide the search, detection, transition to track, and tracking of surface targets. 
The sensor, both on and off board, provides the target data to the AWS.  Next, AWS 
coordinates the NLOS-LS Engagement Planner with the Mission Area Plan. If a PAM is 
in flight, an off-board platform provides pre-launch target data via a data link back to the 
ship. This method presents the advantage of incurring no direct risk to the ship crew 
while engaging the enemy through an aggressive offensive maneuver. The functional 
flow block diagram in Figure 28 shows the general flow of events of an NLOS-LS 




Figure 28:  NLOS-LS System Behavior FFBD.  This diagram shows the general flow 
of events of a typical NLOS-LS engagement.  
 
b. NLOS-LS Engagement and Mission Planning 
NLOS-LS plans tactical missions in CIC via a MFC.  NLOS-LS relies on 
external ship systems to operate such as power, INS, NAVSSI, C&D and organic and off-
board sensors from the ship or other external assets. Once a target is reported, it is added 
to the C&D track database and a decision is made to engage the target.  The schedule for 
engagement will follow the decision to engage by designating the NLOS-LS as the 
priority system for engagement.  With the permission to engage, the NLOS-LS can create 
an engagement order, select PAM missiles from the CLU, and execute the release of the 
PAMs.  When the PAMs are in-flight, it will provide missile health, position status and 
target engagement imagery back to the ship. 
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Figure 29 shows the functional sequence diagram of the AWS and the path 
that is taken to search, detect, designate, and engage a hostile target with NLOS-LS 
integrated into the system. 
 
 
Figure 29:  NLOS-LS Engagement Sequence Diagram.  This is a functional sequence 
diagram of the AWS and the path that is taken to search, detect, designate, and engage a 
hostile target.  
 
c. Organic and Off-Board Sensors 
The organic and off-board sensors (Figure 30) provide the NLOS–LS with 
a search, detect, and track capability that will support NLOS-LS engagements, ranging 
from 0.5 km to beyond NLOS-LS’s maximum range of 40 kilometers. The NLOS-LS 
target database system converts all information received from organic and off-board 
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sensors into a NLOS-LS readable data format. With the use of communication data links, 
the system can share information between ships, MH-60R, and UAVs. 
 
Figure 30:  Organic and Off-Board Sensor FFBD.  The NLOS–LS can search, detect, 
and track targets to support the NLOS-LS engagement. 
 
d. NLOS Engagement Planner  
The NEP can receive missions from on-board ship by the command and 
control system.  The Decision to Engage flowchart in Figure 31 is a lower level of the 
System Behavior FFBD from Figure 28. This process requires the following: all 
personnel need to be clear on the top deck for safety reasons, coordination is performed 
with other platforms, and approval to engage comes from the CO. 
 
Decision to Engage
All Personnel are clear on 
Deck
AND




Figure 31:  NLOS Engagement Planner FFBD.  The NEP can receive missions from 




e. Deployment Operations 
The NLOS-LS will normally be operating in the Tactical Mode and the 
CLU in the Standby Mode during underway operations when hostilities are expected.  
When NLOS-LS has engagements at a state of Make Ready, NLOS-LS will order the 
CLU to the Ready Alert mode.  While in the Ready Alert Mode, NLOS-LS will order 
missile selection and the CLU will power up the selected PAMs.  When there are no 
powered-up PAMs and no engagements have reached the Make Ready state, NLOS-LS 
will order the CLU to the Standby Mode.  Normally PAMs will not be powered up except 
to launch, to conduct missile inventory (to update missile flight software), and to perform 
operational checks as directed by the Type Commander (TYCOM) approved operating 
procedures34.  
For Training scenarios, NLOS-LS will be placed in the Training Mode and 
the CLU will be ordered to the Simulation mode.  NLOS-LS will be returned to the 
Tactical Mode upon completion of the training exercises and the CLU will be ordered 
back to the Standby mode. 
f. Availability Operations 
During in-port periods, the NLOS-LS equipment will be placed in a mode 
to support the required in-port maintenance, training and monitoring operational states.   
During availability, PAM missiles will not be routinely powered up, with the exception 
of performing missile inventory at which time the missile software may be updated.  
During in-port periods, the NLOS-LS can be capable of receiving and storing mission 
data.  Mission and/or Strike Plans may be developed during this timeframe.  
 
B. DDG-51 PHYSICAL INSTALLATION ANALYSIS 
1. Scope of Physical Installation 
The scope of this section is to discuss the different physical installation factors 
needed to determine what, where, and how the NLOS-LS is to be installed on-board U.S. 
Navy ships.  In particular, this discussion focuses on the DDG-51 class destroyer.  The 
                                                 
34  OD 63835 Attack Weapon Control System Concept of Operations, Strategic System Program, 1 
April 2003. 
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U.S. Navy and projects at NSWC Port Hueneme, CA use the Fleet Modernization 
Program (FMP) as the guiding process for new installation requirements.  The FMP 
mission is to provide a disciplined process to deliver operational and technical 
modifications to the Fleet in the most operationally effective and cost efficient way. It 
defines a standard methodology to plan, budget, engineer, and install timely, effective, 
and affordable shipboard improvements while maintaining configuration management 
and supportability35.  It is the means used to provide better technology and innovation to: 
• Keep the war-fighting edge 
• Fix systemic and safety problems 
• Improve Battle Force Interoperability (BFI) 
• Improve platform reliability and maintainability 
• Reduce the burden on the sailor 
In the case of the NLOS-LS, the goal is to give the war-fighter an additional 
capability for the surface craft threat.  Because the NLOS-LS is a new capability, a Ship 
Alteration (SHIPALT) package will need to be developed.  A SHIPALT is an approved 
permanent change to the configuration of a ship that is documented in a Ship Alteration 
Record (SAR) and implemented through the FMP Process. SHIPALTs are classified by 
title/type and comprise any change in hull, machinery, equipment, or fittings, which 
involves changes in design, material, quantity, location, or relationship of the component 
parts of an assembly. The title assigned to a SHIPALT identifies the approving authority 
and responsibility for funding. SHIPALT titles are: 
 
a. Title “K” SHIPALT - A permanent alteration to provide a military 
characteristic, upgrade existing systems or provide additional capability not 
previously held by a ship, which affects configuration-controlled areas or systems 
of a ship or which otherwise requires the installation of Headquarters Centrally 
Provided Material (HCPM). These SHIPALTs are approved for development and 
authorized for accomplishment by the CNO (military improvements) or the 
                                                 
35  Fleet Modernization Program Management and Operations Manual – Revision 2, Commander, 
NAVSEA Systems Command, June 10, 2002. 
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Hardware Systems Commands (HSCs) (non-military improvements). The 
technical approval for Title “K” SHIPALTs is provided by the SPM. 
 
b. Title “D” SHIPALT - A permanent alteration that does not affect the military 
characteristics of a ship. It is technically approved by the SPM in the form of a 
Justification/Cost Form (JCF) and SAR, and authorized for accomplishment by 
the Fleet Commander in Chief (FLTCINC) or Type Commander (TYCOM). It 
may require Centrally Provided Material (CPM), but it does not require HCPM. A 
Title "D" SHIPALT may specify whether it should only be accomplished by a 
depot-level maintenance facility. 
c. Title "F" SHIPALT- A permanent alteration that is technically approved by the 
SPM in the form of a JCF and SAR, and authorized for accomplishment by the 
FLTCINC or TYCOM. It does not require HCPM or CPM and is within ship's 
force capability for accomplishment; however, an Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (IMA) may accomplish the task. 
Figure 32 shows a flow chart for determining which type of SHIPALT is required. 
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Figure 32:  Alteration Decision Tree36.  From the Fleet Modernization Manual, this 
flow chart determines which type of SHIPALT is required. 
 
NLOS-LS would be categorized as a Type K SHIPALT because it is a new 
permanent installation that is adding a capability not previously held.  This is true for the 
DDG-51 ship class as seen in the NLOS-LS concept of operations. It is also determined 
that this will be a conjunctive SHIPALT—ORDALT because of the nature of the NLOS-
LS system.  Conjunctive SHIPALT – ORDALTs are described as imposing an impact on 
a ship’s system (such as an increase in ship’s power, increase in cooling requirements, 
change in weight and moment, and impact on water-tight integrity). 
  
2.   Equipment Analysis 
  This section will describe the key equipments of the system that need to be 
installed both topside and internal to the ship structure.     
 
a. Precision Attack Missile All Up Round (PAM AUR)—The PAM AUR 
is the container housing the weapon to be used on-board the DDG-51.  
The AUR is the means by which the PAM is stored, transported, and 
launched.  Once fired, the container would need to be replaced by another 
AUR.  The AUR resides in the frame of the CLU providing the fire 
control interface.  Some issues the will need to be explored further related 
to the AUR are listed below: 
• Storage 
• Reloading 
• Disposal of expended canisters 
• Maintenance of loaded AURs  
 
b. Computer & Communication System (CCS)—The CCS is the heart of 
the NLOS-LS.  This unit is the same size as one of the PAM AUR and fits 
into the CLU base as the AUR does.  This unit contains the means by 
                                                 
36 Fleet Modernization Program Management and Operations Manual – Revision 2, Commander, 
NAVSEA Systems Command, 10 June 2002. 
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which the PAM AUR is fired.  It also provides the man interface to the 
NLOS-LS.  The Army concept incorporates power into the CCS, which 
energizes the CCS functions as well as the firing signal to the missile.  
One CCS can interface with fifteen PAM AURs.  The Army concept in 
theory could work but is not practical for the Navy.  The functions 
performed by the different pieces of equipment in an Army CCS are 
performed already by ships systems.  The ship can provide the needed 
power, navigation data, and GPS data to the CCS for operations as 
discussed previously.  Some of the CCS functions will be distributed to 
different locations on-board the ship.  The communication/radio system 
will be relocated inside the ship structure, while the antennas associated 
with the radios will be installed on the mast.  Raytheon is investigating the 
dual use of existing antennas.  The display portion of the CLU would be 
relocated to the CIC where the engagement can be scheduled, monitored, 
and controlled.  The ship will translate the sensor data for input into an 
NLOS-LS engagement.  This translated data would be filtered and enter 
the system in CIC. 
 
c. CLU—The CLU is basically the physical structure that houses the missile 
AUR and the CCS.  It is designed so that the PAM, when launched 
vertically, allows the exhaust gases to exit the top of the unit into the 
atmosphere.  This equipment piece would be the physical item to be 
installed to the ship structure.  The CLU contains a removable base 
assembly and a removable forklift structure for ease of maneuvering.  The 
base unit is the means by which the PAM AUR and CCS communicate.  A 
fully loaded unit would weigh approximately 3250 pounds and have 
dimensions of four feet by four feet by six feet. 
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Figure 33:  Exhaust Gases.  During a missile launch, the exhaust gases exit the top of 
the unit into the atmosphere, thus reducing the impact to the ship. 
 
3. CIC Console Configuration 
Currently, DDGs have the Advanced Tactical Display Consoles (ATDC) that are 
used for both the Tomahawk Weapons Control System and Naval Fires Control System 
(NFCS) and are located in Figure 34 by the red circles. The ATDC is a type of MFC 
which consists of a dual CRT or LCD display with a keyboard and a mouse, which has 
the capability to switch between NFCS and Tomahawk by the use of the Ultra Matrix. 
The Ultra Matrix is a video, keyboard, and mouse switch, which has the capability to 
switch between different computer processors on one console. The ATDCs have the 
security capability of displaying information up to Top Secret.  Thus, by adding a video, 
keyboard, and mouse connection from NLOS-LS to the Ultra Matrix, the cost of adding 
new equipment in CIC is minimized and no additional modifications to the CIC are 




Figure 34:  Combat Information Center (CIC).  This is a diagram of a typical layout 
inside CIC. 
 
4. CLU Location Footprint Analysis  
The location footprint analysis will determine the most effective installation 
location for NLOS-LS.  The CLU of the NLOS-LS is the biggest piece of gear needing 
placement topside on the ship.  The footprint dimensions are roughly four feet by four 
feet.  The unit stands approximately six feet tall.  Each CLU holds fifteen PAM AURs.  
The PAMs are vertically launched and use an electromechanical control actuator system 
for initial guidance, thus minimal super structure blockage would be required.   
The footprint location for the communications part of the NLOS-LS also needs to 
be determined.  The CLU has a CCS module that provides the man interface, power, 
navigation, communications, GPS, and Input/Output to the AUR.  Part of the CCS is the 
antenna, which provides two-way communication to the PAMs.  Four candidate locations 
for the NLOS-LS installation are both port and starboard of the forward and aft Vertical 
Launching System (VLS), as seen in Figure 35.  Other potential locations were ruled out 
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of the analysis due to proximity of personnel and blockage zones created by the 
superstructure and mast.   
 
 
Figure 35:  Footprint Location37.  Four candidate locations for the NLOS-LS 
installation are located port and starboard of the forward and aft Vertical Launching 
System (VLS). 
 
For this analysis the focus will be on the forward and aft locations as options.  
Figure 36 below shows some advantages and disadvantages of each location.  The areas 
considered are in descending priority, blockage zones being most important and cabling 
runs being the least.  The purpose of creating the table was to recommend an optimal 
topside location for installing multiple CLU’s. 
 
Location Advantages Disadvantages 
Blockage Zones 
Forward  1. None 1. Blockage of pilot house and 
forward mast 
2. Roughly 180 degree firing 
cutouts needed 
Aft  1. No significant blockage areas 
2. Roughly 90 degree firing 
cutouts needed 
 
                                                 
37 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 










Forward  1. Closer to forward mast for 
communications integration 
 
1. Close proximity to 5” gun 
2. Smaller footprint area for 
RCS material (if added) 
Aft  1. Minimal vertical ship 
structure in proximity. 
2. Larger footprint area for 
additional RCS material (if 
added) 
1. Close proximity of Harpoon 
Launcher (Flight II) 
2. CIWS firings over CLU 
3. Closer proximity to 
helicopter operations 
4. Torpedo Tubes (Flight II) 
Blast Area 
Forward   1. Smaller footprint area for 
blast exhaust and more 
vertical ship structure (Flight 
IIA) 
Aft  1. Bigger footprint area for and 
minimal vertical structures 
for blast exhaust (Flight IIA) 
 
Cabling Runs 
Forward  1. Closer to CIC for computer 
control integration. 
 
Aft   1. Larger distance from forward 
mast and CIC 
Figure 36:  Footprint Location Advantages vs. Disadvantages.  Advantages and 
disadvantages are provided for each location, considered in descending priority. 
 
Installing the CLU on the VLS deck would need to take into account the VLS 
launched missiles’ blast radius and maximize the distance relative to the VLS launcher.  
Additional analysis would need to be performed to analyze this missile blast pattern and 
the impact on the CLU.  The following issues need to be examined to determine the 
optimal location for the CLU: 
a. Blast Damage 
b. Environmental Effects 
c. Stabilization and Alignment 
d. Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) & Spectrum Management (SM) 
e. Radar Cross Section (RCS) Reduction Analysis 
f. Fratricide Analysis 
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The following subsections present a first order analysis of the issues mentioned in 
a through f above.  A more detailed analysis is needed in all areas and is beyond the 
scope of the CRADA shown in Appendix A. 
a. Blast Damage 
PAM blast damage impact to the ship is minimal.  Engineering judgment 
is used to compare the size dimensions between a PAM and a Standard Missile in Figure 
37 (figure is roughly to scale).  One concludes that the impact of a PAM launch is far less 
(more than an order of magnitude in weight) than that of a Standard Missile.  Considering 
the current ship configuration can support Standard Missile or Tomahawk firings, and the 
fact that when a PAM is fired the exhaust exits the top of the CLU, blast damage to 
topside equipment would be minimal especially if installed on the aft VLS deck.   
 
Figure 37:  Standard Missile38 vs. PAM.  Engineering judgment shows that blast 
damage will be minimal when comparing the size dimensions between a PAM and SM-2. 
b. Environmental Effects 
Whenever a system is placed on-board a U.S. Navy ship, the 
environmental effects on all the associated system components must be taken into 
account.  One approach would be to examine the Navy specification for the electronic 
                                                 
38 Raytheon Website, “Standard Missile-2: International Fleet Defense”, 2006, available from the 
Internet, http://www.raytheon.com/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms01_055768.pdf, 















equipment as it relates to different environmental conditions.  Some of the key areas that 
would need to be tested are shown in Figure 38. 
After examining the Navy environmental effects specification, a 
determination can be made whether the NLOS-LS system meets or exceeds what the U.S. 
Navy would deem acceptable.    
c. Stabilization and Alignment 
The Army concept is for the NLOS-LS to be fired from a static location 
and have an internal self-aligning capability.  In a shipboard environment, the NLOS-LS 
would be subjected to ship motion.  The issue then arises of the conditions needed in 
order for the NLOS-LS to operate.  NetFires, composed of Raytheon Missile Systems and 
Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, successfully conducted a Ballistic Test 
Vehicle (BTV) flight test for the NLOS-LS PAM at the Eglin Air Force Base, Florida test 
range on February 16, 2006.39  
 
Environmental Condition Shipboard Requirement (Test Method) 
Temperature (High / Low) -33°C to +71°C for 2 hours after stabilization (Method 501.4 / 
502.4) 
Solar Radiation Cycle A1:  1120 W/m2 and 49°C for continuous 24 hour diurnal 
cycle (Method 505.4) 
Salt Fog 48 hour exposure to 5±1% salt solution concentration / 48 hour 
drying time, at 35±2°C (Method 509.4) 
Vibration Shipboard random vibration exposure of 0.0010 g2/Hz from 1.0 to 
100 Hz for 2 hours (Method 514.5) 
Ballistic Shock Ballistic Hull and Turret, Full spectrum, Ballistic Shock 
Qualification, with Peak Displacement < 42 mm  (Method 522) 
Figure 38:  Environmental Effects.  These environmental requirements provide a 
foundation for the NLOS-LS system.40 
                                                 
39 Spacewar Website, “Netfires Conducts Navy Ballistic Flight Test For NLOS-LS Missile”, 29 
March 2006, available from the internet, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/NetFires_Conducts_Navy_Ballistic_Flight_Test_For_NLOS_LS_Missil
e.html, access date on 28 February 2007. 
40 MIL-STD-810F Test Method Standard for Environmental Engineering Considerations and 
Laboratory Tests, Department of Defense, 1 January 2000. 
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The PAM missile BTV was vertically launched from the NLOS-LS CLU 
that was integrated onto a motion simulator. The ship motion simulator was able to 
replicate a range of sea conditions that the LCS is likely to encounter while under way. 
The PAM BTV flight test was conducted in upper-sea-state-three conditions to 
demonstrate the safe egress of the PAM missile from the CLU. Sea state three represents 
conditions where a vessel experiences three- to five-foot waves and winds exceeding 15 
knots. 
This testing demonstrated the ability of the NLOS-LS to fire missiles in a 
simulated at sea environment.  These results can be applied to this case study of the DDG 
51 concluding that stabilization and alignment are not an issue. 
d. Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) and Spectrum 
Management (SM) 
An evaluation of NLOS-LS to analyze and assess the E3 impact to the 
system would need to be completed.  This E3 analysis would include most, if not 
everything, as described in the following paragraphs.  Further information is provided in 
detail below. 
E3 is defined as the impact of the electromagnetic environment upon the 
operational capability of military forces, equipment, systems, and platforms. It 
encompasses all electromagnetic disciplines, including electromagnetic compatibility 
(EMC), electromagnetic interference (EMI), electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV), 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), electronic protection (EP), hazards of electromagnetic 
radiation to personnel (HERP), ordnance (HERO), and volatile materials (HERF), and 
natural phenomenon effects of lightning and precipitation static (PStatic).  
SM is defined as planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative 
procedures, with the objective of enabling electronic systems to perform their functions 
in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference. The 
major components of SM are Spectrum Certification (SC) and frequency assignment. SC 
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is the process (called the JF-12 Process) by which spectrum dependent 
systems/equipment are certified to operate in a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum41. 
e. Radar Cross Section (RCS) Analysis 
Appendix E shows the detailed calculation of the RCS of the CLU and the 
DDG 51.  The CLU was calculated assuming the worst possible case in which it acts as a 
flat plate.  A radar frequency of 9 GHz was used in the calculations.  The CLU RCS is 
44.8 dB.  The DDG 51 RCS was calculated using an empirical formula and is a function 
of the radar frequency and the displacement.  The DDG 51 RCS is 51.5 dB.  A power dB 
addition was next performed to show the resultant RCS gain accounting for 2 CLU’s 
being installed on the same side of the ship.  The resultant total value is 53.1 or a gain of 
1.6 dB.  RCS mitigation techniques can now be used to reduce the additional RCS. 
Discipline Definition 
EMC The ability of systems, equipment, and devices that utilize the electromagnetic spectrum to 
operate in their intended operational environments without suffering unacceptable degradation 
or causing unintentional degradation because of electromagnetic radiation or response. It 
involves the application of sound electromagnetic spectrum management; system, equipment, 
and device design configurations that ensure interference-free operation; and clear concepts 
and doctrines that maximize operational effectiveness. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
EMI Any electromagnetic disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the 
effective performance of electronics/electrical equipment. It can be induced intentionally, as 
in some forms of electronic warfare, or unintentionally, as a result of spurious emissions and 
responses, intermodulation products, and the like. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
EMV The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to 
perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of 
electromagnetic environmental effects. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
EMP The electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear explosion caused by Compton-recoil electrons 
and photoelectrons from photons scattered in the materials of the nuclear device or in a 
surrounding medium. The resulting electric and magnetic fields may couple with 
electrical/electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges (pulses). May 
also be caused by non-nuclear means. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
EP That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and 
equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
HERO The danger of accidental actuation of electro-explosive devices or otherwise electrically 
activating ordnance because of radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic fields. This unintended 
actuation could have safety (premature firing) or reliability (dudding) consequences. (Joint 
Pub 1-02) 
HERP Potential for electromagnetic radiation to produce harmful biological effects in humans. 
(ANSI C63.14-1998) 
HERF Potential for electromagnetic radiation to cause spark ignition of volatile combustibles, such 
as aircraft fuel. (ANSI C63.14-1998) 
                                                 
41  E3 and SM Assessment Guide for Operational Testing, Director Operational Test and Evaluation 
DOT&E, 13 June 2001.  
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Discipline Definition 
Lightning Direct Effects - Any physical damage to the system structure and electrical/electronic 
equipment due to the direct attachment of the lightning channel. These effects include tearing, 
bending, burning, vaporization, or blasting of hardware. 
 
Indirect Effects - Electrical transients induced by lightning in electrical circuits due to 
coupling of electromagnetic fields. (MIL-STD 464) 
P-Static Electromagnetic interference effects primarily on antenna-connected receivers caused by 
corona discharge at sharp edges or points of a structure, arcing across non-conductive 
surfaces, and arching between conductive joints or panels which are not electrically bonded. 
(ANSI STD C63.14-1998) 
Figure 39:  Definitions of the Electromagnetic Disciplines Covered by E3.  Provided 
from E3 and SM Assessment Guide for Operational Testing. 
The CLU’s Radar Cross Section (RCS) can be reduced by treating them 
with a material that will absorb the radar energy at the frequency of interest. A specular 
or free space absorber will act through phase cancellation or impedance taper to 
effectively absorb the radar energy.  Greater reductions in RCS can be achieved through 
shaping, i.e. making the target object of such a shape as to either scatter the incoming 
radar waves in a direction other than back towards the receiver or rounding the object to 
minimize the return.  Often though, this cannot be done as it is needed to reduce the RCS 
of an existing object or an objects operation forbids much shaping.  In these cases RCS 
can be reduced by the application of Radar Absorbent Material (RAM).  Both of these 
issues can be addressed further to determine if they are viable solutions.  The additional 
shaping material may not be acceptable if it were to increase the footprint of CLU 
installation.  Also, while RAM may be a solution analysis would need to be conducted to 
determine if the RAM could withstand the blast of either a PAM or missiles housed in the 
VLS launcher. 
f. Fratricide Analysis 
With the addition of a new weapon system on DDG-51 class destroyer 
ships, fratricide becomes a bigger concern.  NLOS-LS needs to be coordinated and 
scheduled with fratricide taken into account due to the relative slow speed of the PAM 
compared to other possible weapons.  For example, NLOS-LS can be launched 
immediately after an SM-2 but there should be a delay in launching a SM-2 after a 
NLOS-LS launch to give the slower (on the order of five times slower) and smaller PAM 
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an opportunity to get clear of the ship and/or the SM-2 path.  This potential issue between 
the weapon systems and PAM is beyond the scope of this paper and requires further 
analysis. 
 
5. Safety Issues 
When integrating NLOS-LS on the DDGs, safety is considered the highest 
priority. Currently, on all DDGs, Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTV) are used to ensure 
that the top deck is clear of personnel prior to a missile launch. Salvo warning alarms and 
lights are also required to be energized just before a launch to alert personnel on the 
weather deck of a pending launch. Finally, toxic vent dampers must also be cycled during 
a launch to ensure toxic gases released by a missile do not enter the ship and cause injury 
or death to personnel.  These safety features would also be appropriate for PAM. 
 
C. EVALUATION OF ISSUES 
1. Notional Implementation 
As a result of the physical installation analysis and applying the U.S. Navy’s FMP 
process, NLOS-LS could be installed topside on the DDG-51 ship class.  The size of the 
NLOS-LS is such that multiple units could and should be installed on-board to maximize 
effectiveness.  The best location would be on the port and starboard sides of the aft 
MK41 VLS launcher.  This location would minimize blockage and provide larger 
footprint area for which the NLOS-LS can operate.  Procedures would need to be 
developed to determine how NLOS-LS will be utilized to eliminate fratricide.  For 
example, a necessary delay will be determined by the intercept time of the PAM with its 
target and ensures that the missile is out of the near-vicinity of the ship before a SM 
launch.  Radar cross section is important on this ship class and if by installing NLOS-LS 
topside increased the RCS dramatically, material could be shaped and installed around 
the launchers to minimize RCS.  As with any system, the cabling requirements would 
need to be determined in order for the system to function. 
  60
The recommended location is the port and starboard locations of the aft VLS 
launcher as seen in Figure 40 (red circles) for both the DDG-51 Flight II and IIA ships.  
The following is a list of reasons for the following reasons: 
• Maximizes the firing zones  
• Minimal blockage 
• Larger area for blast damage dispersion 
• Less vertical infrastructure impact than forward option 
The set of yellow circles provide an alternative location in the event that analysis 
shows that the SM-2 / Tomahawk blast radius is too large.  It could also be used to site 
additional NLOS-LS modules if desired. 
 
Figure 40:  DDG-51 Topside Configuration42.  The recommended location is the port 




2. Risk Mitigation 
                                                 
42 Netfires LLC, “NLOS-LS (PAM/CLU) Accelerating Capability To the U.S. Navy” Presentation, 
provided by Raytheon for the project. 
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Figure 41 shows the issues that must be addressed when installing NLOS-LS on a 
DDG-51. Included in this table are a preliminary level of risk that is involved and a brief 
recommendation to resolve each issue.  This figure presents a starting point for follow on 
studies that must be done to ensure a proper integration of the combat system.  The level 
of risk is defined as follows: 
• High – Significant Impact, Mission Critical 
• Medium – Some Impact, Non Mission Critical 
• Low – Minimal Impact, Non Mission Critical 
 
 
Integration Issues Risk 
 
Recommendations 
Physical Location of CLU 
 
Medium: 
• Blast Damage created by 
the PAM. 
• Physical obstructions of the 
flight path of the PAM 
• Place the CLU near the rear VLS 
launcher. 
• The area near the VLS launcher 
has no obstructions to the flight 
path of a missile launch.  
RCS Issues with CLU Medium: 
• Increases the Radar Cross 
Section of the ship. 
• Modify CLUs radar signature to 
reduce RCS 
Integration with CIC Low: 
• Available space in CIC. 
• Impact to other systems. 
• Use the existing ATDC to 
minimize change to the CIC. 
Integration with Radio Medium: 
• Location of Antenna. 
• Further investigation need to be 
done.   
Integration with Sensors High: 
• Data compatibility with 
existing sensors. 
• Need for a sensor that 
detects targets over the 
horizon. 
• Use of the MH-60 and UAVs as a 
forward-looking sensor. 
Safety Issues Low: 
• Impact to the safety of the 
crew during a missile 
launch. 
• Use current safety procedures 
during a missile launch. 
• Verify weather deck is clear by 
using the CCTV. 
• Ensure Toxic Vent Dampers are 
cycled. 
Integration with Existing Ship 
Systems  
Medium: 
• Incompatible data source 
• Modify hardware and software for 
compatibility. 
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Integration Issues Risk 
 
Recommendations 
Environmental Effects Medium: 
• Damage to equipment due 
to salt water, fog, 
temperature, solar 
radiation, shipboard shock 
and vibration. 
• Examine the Army specification 
for NLOS environmental 
conditions.  
Stabilization and Alignment Low: 
• Unable to Launch due to 
Sea State and weather 
conditions. 
• Initial tests demonstrate feasibility 
Integration of C&D and WCS  Medium:  
• Hardware and Software 
change required 
• Further investigation need to be 
done 
Figure 41:  NLOS-LS Integration Risk Matrix.  These issues and their respective risks 




The tasks involved with each integration issue have varying degrees of scope: 
• Physical Location of CLU 
- Power/shipboard resources analysis (outside the scope of this 
study) 
- Blast damage analysis (completed by this study) 
- Fratricide analysis (outside the scope of this study) 
• RCS Issues with CLU 
- RCS Impact on ship (completed by this study) 
- RCS Reduction (outside the scope of this study) 
• Integration with CIC 
- Interface analysis of existing systems (completed by this study) 
- Implement communication interface with MFC’s (outside the 
scope of this study) 
• Integration with Radio 
- Conduct risk assessment of JTRS Radio (to be completed when 
JTRS is technologically ready) 
• Integration with Sensors 
- Off-board sensor feasibility analysis (completed by this study) 
• Safety Issues 
- Safety analysis (outside the scope of this study) 
• Integration with Existing Ship Systems (such as WSN, NAVSSI, GCCS-M, and 
Cryptographic.) 
- Coordinate with ship systems (outside the scope of this study) 
• Environmental Effects 
- Environmental Impact analysis (outside the scope of this study) 
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• Stabilization and Alignment 
- Launcher movement impact on missile launch (completed by 
Raytheon previously) 
• Integration of C&D and WCS 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  65
IV. CONCLUSION 
This system engineering integration project has focused on integrating the NLOS-
LS onto the DDG-51 class destroyer.  Prior to performing any analysis, this report 
addressed topics relevant to why NLOS-LS should be incorporated into the U.S. Navy.  
These topics included: 
• NLOS-LS providing over the horizon fire support against multiple 
small craft threats 
• The demonstrated capability of NLOS-LS in tests performed to 
date against small surface craft threats.   
• The damage results by the PAM missile/warhead to a typical small 
craft. 
 The approach methodology of the project was the next logical step.  A bottom-up 
approach was used because the project dealt with the integration of an existing weapon 
system, NLOS-LS, onto DDG-51 class ships.  LCS related work was also researched as 
background to determine if any of the LCS concepts could be applied to the DDG-51.  
One concept, the MEC, appears to have application.  The MEC could provide the 
interface between the AEGIS combat system and NLOS-LS.  This concept was explored 
further in the combat system integration analysis.     
The overall integration analysis was split into two parts: one part analyzed the 
physical installation issues while the other focused on the combat system integration 
issues.   
The physical components of NLOS-LS consist of a CLU, CCS, and PAM.  The 
Army concept of operations includes having all functional components of the NLOS-LS 
contained in a single unit, self-powered, and usable by a local or remote operator.  Part of 
the integration analysis focused primarily on the physical components of the NLOS-LS 
system and how they would be installed on-board the DDG-51 class ships.  The 
following points are the results of this analysis: 
• The functionality of the CCS can be redistributed to the DDG’s 
CIC.  The CCS as built in the Army configuration contains the user 
interface, power, radio, antenna, GPS and interface to the missiles.   
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• NAVSSI is a possible source of navigation data 
• WSN-7 can provide own ship’s position information 
• Ship power would be provided to NLOS-LS (this is included in the 
second study, currently in progress) 
• The user interface would be relocated to CIC in a MFC 
• The antenna would be relocated to the mast for a maximum range 
of 103 miles at a PAM height of 2000 feet 
• The NLOS Radio would communicate with the CCS housed in the 
CLU 
• Hardwire Ethernet cables would be required to provide two way 
communication between the NEP and the CLU and also between 
the CLU and the NLOS Radio 
In addition to determining the physical interfaces, a location analysis was 
performed and a recommendation was made to install up to four CLU units on the port 
and starboard side of the aft VLS launchers.  This analysis took into account the blockage 
zones, existing infrastructure, blast area, and cabling runs.  Once the location was 
determined, further analysis was performed on the blast damage, environmental effects, 
stabilization and alignment, electromagnetic environmental effects, radar cross section, 
and fratricide.  Time constraints limited the work done in these areas and a 
recommendation to conduct further work was provided and will be discussed shortly.  
Finally as part of the physical installation analysis, the FMP was briefly described as the 
governing process to follow when it was determined to integrate NLOS-LS with the 
DDG-51 class destroyer.  The key point here is to recognize that NLOS-LS is a Type K 
SHIPALT because it is a permanent installation and is adding a capability not previously 
held. 
The combat system integration first focused on the data interface paths.  Although 
NLOS-LS could interface at a couple different points on the DDG, it was recommended 
to connect through the C&D data line.  The C&D seemed a logical choice because it 
receives all of the sensor inputs as well as interfaces with the WCS.  By incorporating the 
MEC functionality mentioned above, the C&D with MEC could provide the NLOS-LS 
with the communication path needed for engagements.     
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Once the data paths were determined, a series of Hatley-Pirbhai architecture 
diagrams were created showing the interactions of the different system components and 
how functions are traced to those components.  AFD’s were created for the NEP, CLU, 
PAM, and NLOS communications.  In addition to the AFD’s, a series of FFBD’s were 
created, breaking down the NLOS-LS system behavior.  The system behavior and 
associated drawings provide a high-level view of how NLOS-LS would plan and execute 
missions.   
Areas that need to be addressed in future studies include: logistics, power 
interface requirements, optimal number and location of launchers on deck, maintenance, 
and lower level interfaces to the ship’s existing combat systems. 
1. For logistics, more in-depth analysis needs to be done to address issues such 
as individual canister storage (i.e. magazines), intra-ship movement, loading 
and reloading, spare parts, etc.  
2. An analysis of ship support services including cable runs and lengths, 
minimum power requirements, and heating and ventilation concerns is 
required. 
3. The optimal number of launchers and the location of the launchers will have 
to be addressed so that the NLOS-LS system has maximum capability without 
affecting other shipboard systems.  
4. A list of maintenance requirements is needed for the NLOS-LS system to be 
integrated onto the DDG-51.  
5. An in-depth study needs to be done on the lower-level interfaces to the ship’s 
existing combat systems. 
6. A detailed location and footprint analysis including missile blast impact and 
fratricide issues is necessary. 
7. Environmental and electromagnetic effects need further research. 
8. Alignment and stabilization issues need to be researched thoroughly. 
9. Targeting data from the C&D data line with the inclusion of the MEC needs to 
be analyzed. 
10. Scheduling and doctrine issues need to be further defined along with the issue 
of fratricide. 
In closing, this project report focused on key integration issues.  Using a system 
engineering approach to research the issues provides one with recommendations but more 
importantly awareness into other areas that must be further researched.  While the scope 
of the project was limited to the issues addressed, the overall conclusion is that NLOS-LS 








































APPENDIX A. CRADA DOCUMENT 
FIRST AMENDMENT OF 
  
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT  
  
BETWEEN   
  
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
  
AND   
  
RAYTHEON COMPANY  
  
  
Per Article 11, NCRADA-NPS-05-0084, the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and Raytheon Company agree to 
amend the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(CRADA),  titled, “Maximizing The Utility of Shipboard 
System: Shipboard Missile Reloading and Integration Study”  
as follows:  
  
1.  Cover Page:   
   
Naval Postgraduate School Principal Investigator  
  
From:  Jeffery Crowson, Code OR, 831.656.2618  
       
To:   Mike Green, Code SE, 831.656.1084  
  
2.  Article 3.1 is replaced in its entirety with:  
  
 3.1 NPS Personnel and Facilities  
  
The Cooperative Work done by NPS will be 
performed under the program guidance of Mike Green, PI, NPS 
Code SE, who has the responsibility for the scientific and 
technical conduct of the Cooperative Work performed within 
the facilities of NPS or done on behalf of NPS by third 
parties in support of this Agreement.   
  
RAYTHEON personnel who perform Cooperative Work 
at NPS facilities will be supervised by the RAYTHEON PI.  
  
  70
4.  Article 5.1 is amended as follows:  
  
Replace: Raytheon agrees to pay NPS $100,000.  
  
With:    Raytheon agrees to pay NPS $125,000.  
5. Appendix A-1 is appended herein.   
  
  
For Raytheon Company (Raytheon):  
  
I, the undersigned, am duly authorized to bind Raytheon Company to the amendments of 
this Agreement and do so by affixing my signature hereto.  
  
Entered into this ___day of _________, 200_.  
  
  
By: ___________________________________  
     SUSAN G. SLOJKOWSKI  
 Contracts Negotiator  
  
  
For the Department of the Navy:  
  
I, the undersigned, by 15 USC 3710a and Navy regulations, am duly authorized to bind 
the U.S. Navy to this Agreement and do so by affixing my signature hereto.  
  
Entered into this ___day of _________, 200_.  
  
  
By: ____________________________________  
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The Collaborators agree to perform the following tasks with options that can be executed 
in follow-on studies:  
  
1.0 NPS will be responsible for the following tasks: 
  
  1.1  NLOS PAM Weapon System on DDG-51 Study:  
NPS will be responsible for working with the Naval Surface Warfare Center Port 
Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) on the tasks described in Figure 1 and will submit a 
final report to Raytheon.  
  
The effort will be covered in two phases with the sub-tasks of each phase listed in 
Figure 1.  Raytheon will provide up to $25,000 for completion of the Phase I tasks 
listed in Figure 1 below.  Raytheon will have an option to execute Phase II for up to 
$25,000 in additional funds.  The period of performance for Phase 1 is six months 
from execution.  The period of performance will be determined for Phase 2 if the 
option is exercised.  
  
 1.2  NPS, along with NSWC will ensure that any RAYTHEON proprietary models or 
data for future weapons and sensor technologies are not released to outside 
contractors or foreign students.  
  
 1.3  During each phase of this project NPS working with NSWC will submit hard copies 
and electronic copies of the following reports:  
  
 1.3.1  A “Start-Up Status Report” at the beginning of the CRADA, summarizing 
thoughts and issues prior to beginning work.  This should include a schedule 
showing baseline milestones and a projected spending plan.  
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 1.3.2  “Status Reports” (interim reports, at 1 month intervals) describing NPS/NSWC 
PHD progress, findings, problems encountered, etc.  
  
 1.3.3  Phase I and Phase II Final Reports describing the completed project, and 
incorporating all findings and work completed, summarizing problems 
encountered and unresolved issues, as well as suggestions for the direction of 
future work.  
  
 1.3.4  NPS will coordinate a final debriefing at PHD in PowerPoint format.   
   
2.0 RAYTHEON will be responsible for the following tasks:  
  
   2.1  Provide RAYTHEON weapon systems data of interest to  NPS and NSWC PHD 
through the Technical Interchange  Meeting Format required by NSWC PHD.  
  
  2.2  Provide direction to NPS/NSWC PHD on technical  
  matters relevant to all tasks.  
  
  
3.0 NPS and RAYTHEON will be responsible for the following joint tasks: 
   
  3.1  Raytheon will review all reports produced by NPS/NSWC PHD and provide 
feedback and critiques as necessary and relevant.   NPS working with NSWC PHD 
will respond to this feedback and critiques and incorporate them into a revised 
document.  Each party will have 30 days to respond to the other and this process will 
continue for a single iteration.  
  
   3.2  Both NPS working with NSWC PHD and Raytheon will hold a joint “Kick-Off” 
meeting to establish a conduit for the sharing of data and technical expertise as 
needed.  
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FIGURE 1 – WORK SCHEDULE  
  
System Analysis  Phase I Subtasks  Phase II Subtasks  
C2 Integration  
Target Designation 
CONOPS  Fire Inhibit  
   IFF  Break Engage  
   Local Control  Battleshort  
   Displays  Fratricide  
        
Safety  Firing Cutouts  Hangfire/Dud Procedures  
   HERO levels  Aviation Interference  
        
Installation  Location footprint  Ballistic Protection (if needed)  
   Mech/Elec Interface  Corrosion Control  
   RCS Reduction  Installation and Fielding  
   Grounding  Installation and verification testing  
   SHIPALT Prep     
   
Conjunctive ORDALT 
Prep     
        
Test and 
Evaluation     Operational Test Plan  
      Test Conduct  
      Use of Self-Defense Test Ship (SDTS)  
      Surface Targets  
      Range Time / Scheduling  
      Surface Targets  
      Range Time / Scheduling  
        
Logistics     Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals  
      
Sparing Plan / On-Board Allowance / On-Board 
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APPENDIX B.  PAM BASELINE WARHEAD CALCULATION 
 
The calculations for PAM Baseline Warhead are base on the following formulas43:  
 
1. The initial velocity of fragments of warhead: 
)/(1
/20 MCK
MCEV +∆= , 
 Where: 
 E∆2 = the Gurney Constant for the explosive material. 
 C = explosive weight 
 M = weight of the casing 
 K  = configuration constant (flat plate=1/3, cylinder=1/2, sphere=3/5) 
 








ρ  = the density of air, normally 1.2 kg/m3 
0V  = the fragment velocity 
Cd  = the coefficient of drag. (Depends on the shape of the fragment and to 
 some extent, the velocity) 
A = the cross-sectional area of the fragment (m2).  
 m = mass of individual fragment (kg) 
 
3. The kinetic energy equation relates mass of the fragment to its velocity at range S: 
 2)2/1( smKE υ= , 
 Where: 
 KE  = kinetic energy (J) 
 m = mass of individual fragment (kg) 
 Vs  = velocity at range S (m/s) 
 
4. The expected number of fragments hitting the target: 
 )4/( 20 RNANhits π=  
Where:  
Nhits  = the expected number of fragments hitting the target; 
No  = the initial number of fragments from the warhead;  
A  = the frontal area of the target presented to the warhead; and  
R  = the range of the target to the warhead. 
                                                 
43  Commander, Naval Ordnance Systems Command. Weapons Systems Fundamentals. NAVORD OP 
3000, vol. 2, 1st Rev. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971. 
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5. When estimating the Pk from a fragmentation warhead, you must take into 
account the number of fragments that are expected to hit the target. Multiple hits 
must be handled appropriately. To wit, the correct manipulation of probabilities. 
For multiple hits the overall Pk is found from 
 
Pk = 1 - (1-PK|hit)Nhits, if Nhits > 1, or  Pk = Nhits Pk|hit, if Nhits < 1 
 









)1ln( CEPPLR k−= , 
Where: 
CEP  = the Circular Error Probable of the weapon; 
   
NOTE: The calculations for PAM Baseline Warhead are based on assumptions of 
BOFORS 3P rounds data. 
 
 
Figure 42:  BOFORS 3P Round Data.  The BOFORS 3P rounds data represented by 
BOFORS Defense AB, A United Defense Company on June 200244. 
 
The data for PAM Baseline warhead: 
 Length:   ~ 7.94 in 
 Diameter:  7.00in 
 Total weight:   16.07lbs (~7.29 kg) 
 Weight of explosive:  7.89lbs (~3.58 kg) 
                                                 
44  BOFORS DEFENCE, BOFORS 3P and System Concept, Presentation by Mr. Michael Boren, June 
2002. 
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 Range:   40 km (~21.60 nautical miles) 
 
Calculations: 
1. Calculate the number of fragments of PAM baseline warhead (base on the radio 
of 3P rounds data). 
 
 (7.29/2.5)*3000 ≈ 8748  
 (7.29/6.2)*8000 ≈ 9406 
 The average ≈ (8748 + 9406)/2 ≈ 9077 
 
 Mass of individual fragments: 7.3/9077= 0.0008 kg 
 
2. Calculate the velocity at range S (m/s). Assuming small surface crafts target has 
20kJ fragment energy of heavy damage. 
  
 KE = (1/2)mVs2  
 20 = (1/2) (0.0008) Vs2 -> Vs ≈ 223.60 
 




MCEV +∆=  
 Gurney Constant for the explosive material is PBX-9404 ≈ 2637 m/s 
 C/M = (3.58/7.29) ≈ 0.49 
 K=1/2 for cylinder 
 1+ (1/2)(0.49) ≈ 1.245 
 Vo = (2637)Sqrt{(0.49)/(1.245)} ≈ 1654.34 m/s 
 
4. Calculate the distance traveled (assuming the coefficient of drag is 0.5, and the 








 S = {ln (Vs/Vo)}/{- ρCd(A/2m)}  
 S ≈ {ln (223.60/1654.34)}/{-(1.2)(0.5)(1/(2(0.0008))} ≈ 1.8 m 
 
5. Calculate the expected number of fragments hitting and probability of kill of the 
target. 
  
 The frontal area of the target presented to the warhead is  
 2.7m x 10.1m ≈ 27.13 m2 RAC. 
)4/( 20 RNANhits π=  
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 Nhits = 3(27.13)/(4π(1.8)2)= 2. 
  
 The probability heavy damage of small surface crafts is 6/24=0.25 from Raytheon 
 chevron formation simulation.  
  
 Therefore, 
   
 Pk = 1 - (0.25)2 = 0.9375.  
 
6. Calculate the Lethal Radius (LR) of the PAM. 
 
CEP = the radius of the circle that can be drawn to include 1/2 of the warheads 
(base on the radio of 3P rounds data, PAM has approximately twice of CEP 2 x 






)1ln( 2mCEPPLR k −=−=   
 
 LR = 1600 m2  
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APPENDIX C.  ARENA MODEL 
 
A. ARENA MODEL 
The objective of the ARENA Model is to better understand the NLOS-LS 
operational sequence in naval combat environments and evaluate system performance.  It 
was developed with the intent to insert usable data to reflect the actual NLOS-LS 
environment.  Due to the fact that this system data was not available during the time 
period of this study, the simulation provided only speculative results.  Further work can 
be carried out with more accurate data to understand the performance of NLOS-LS better.  
The model will be used to analyze the number of missiles needed and the number of 
threats disposed to NLOS-LS or another weapon system.   
 
B. MODEL EXPLANATION 
 
There are four parts to model the scenario of a single inbound target, detected at 
the maximum range. The first part of the model shows the off-board sensor search, 
detect, and track of targets. The second part of the model shows the off-board sensor 
providing targets’ data to naval ship’s target database system. The ship will process the 
data and make the decision to engage either to the NLOS-LS or another weapon system 
on-board the ship.  The third part of the model shows the schedule of engagements 
already made for NLOS-LS. The NEP will receive NAVSSI’s almanac data, WSN’s GPS 
alignment data, COP’s track data, COMMS’s communication/tasking data, and sensor’s 
target data. When all the data is received, the NEP will select a PAM to spin up and 
upload mission data. The final part of the model shows a PAM that is in-flight. During a 
PAM in-flight mission, the target data will update continuously. If the target survives the 
first PAM engagement, the NEP will command another engagement.  
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Figure 43:  Detect-Track-Engage Sequence for NLOS-LS.  The objective of the 
ARENA Model is to better understand the NLOS-LS operational sequence in naval 











C. BASIC ANIMATION AND EXPLANATION 
 
 Symbols Description 
 
The CREATE block generates arriving entities to a process model. 
 
The ASSIGN block is used for assigning new values to variables. 
 
 
The PROCESS block is intended as the main processing method in 
the simulation.  
 
The DISPOSE block immediately disposes of any arriving entities. 
 
 
The RECORD block is used to collect statistics in the simulation 
model. 
 
The DECIDE block allows for decision-making processes in the 
system. 
 
The STATION block represents a point in the model to which entities 
are transferred. 
 
The ROUTE block transfers the entity in Duration time units to the 
station specified by the operand Destination. 
 
This picture represents the off-board sensor (MH-60R). 
 
This picture represents the DDG-51.  
 This picture represents the target data, communication/tasking data, 
GPS alignment data, track data, and almanac data. 
 This picture represents a busy signal in the PROCESS block. 
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APPENDIX D.  AN/SPY 1 RADAR HORIZON CALCULATION 
 
 
The formula for the distance to the radar horizon is:45 
 
 
Distance to the radar horizon R = (2⋅((4/3)⋅Rearth)⋅h) 0.5 
 
 




Assume 60 ft (18.28800m) antenna height 
5 ft (1.52400m) height of the target. 
 
The radar horizon for antenna height 
(2⋅(4/3)⋅6378155⋅18.28800) 0.5 = 17636.61m 
 
The radar horizon for target height 
(2⋅(4/3)⋅6378155⋅1.52400) 0.5 = 5091.25m 
 
The horizon limitation is 






                                                 
45 Introduction to Airborne Radar Website, "Radio Waves and Alternating Current Signals", 1997, 
available from the internet, http://radarproblems.com/chapters/ch04.dir/ch04pr.dir/c04p3.dir/c04p3.htm, 
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APPENDIX E.  RCS CALCULATION 
 
The below calculations will show the CLU RCS and the DDG 51 at a frequency of 9 
GHz.  The DDG was calculated using a simple empirical expression that permits the 
cross section to be expressed in terms of the ship’s displacement and the radar 
frequency.46  
 


























































































                                                 
46 Nathanson Fred E., Reilly J. Patrick, Cohen Marvin N., Radar Design Principles Signal Processing 
and the Environment 2nd Edition, Mendham NJ:  Scitech Publishing Inc., 1999, pages 182-183. 
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Assumption:  The average of the cross section for the DDG-51 was taken about the port 
































Now that the RCS for the CLU and DDG have been calculated and converted to dB, a 
power addition is performed to show the additional RCS the CLU has on the DDG. 
  














Difference In Decibels Between Two Levels Being Added 
 
 
Difference in between the DDG and the CLU is 51.5dB - 44.8dB = 6.7dB. Using 
the graph above the Increment in dB to be added to the higher level or the DDG is 
roughly 0.85dB. 
Therefore the new total RCS of the DDG with a single CLU added is 52.35dB.  
Performing this calculation for another CLU if two are installed on the same side of the 
DDG results is a total RCS of 53.1dB.   
 
The comparison shows that the addition of two CLU’s would only add 1.6dB.  This 
accounts for the worst case scenario and can be minimized further by using RCS 
reduction techniques. 
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APPENDIX G.  ACRONYM LIST 
AAW  Anti-Air Warfare 
ACS Aegis Combat System 
AFCD Architecture Flow Context Diagram 
AFD Architecture Flow Diagram 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATDC Advanced Tactical Display Consoles 
ATR Automatic Target Recognition 
AUR All Up Round 
AWS Aegis Weapons System 
BDI Battle Damage Imagery 
BDII Battle Damage Indication Imagery 
BFI Battle Force Interoperability 
BIT Built-In Test 
CCS Computer and Communications System 
CCTV Closed Caption Television 
CEP Cooperative Engagement Planner 
CFF Call For Fire 
CIC Combat Information Center 
CIWS Close-In Weapon System 
CLU Container Launch Unit 
CO Commanding Officer 
COA Course of Action 
COP Common Operational Picture 
CPM Centrally Provided Material 
CRADA  Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
CS Combat System 
C2 Command and Control 
C&D Command and Decision 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 
Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse 
EMV Electromagnetic Vulnerability 
EO/IR  Electro-Optics and Infrared 
EP Electronic Protection 
ESM Electronic Support Measures 
E3 Electromagnetic, Environmental Effects 
FC Fire Controlman 
FCS Future Combat Systems 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
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FLIR Forward Looking Infrared 
FLTCINC Fleet Commander in Chief 
FMP Fleet Modernization Program 
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System-Maritime 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HCPM Headquarters Centrally Provided Material 
HERF Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Volatile 
Materials 
HERO Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance 
HERP Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel 
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IR Infrared 
JCF Justification/Cost Form 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 
LCS Littoral Combat Ships 
MEC Module Engagement Control 
MFC Multi-Function Console 
MP Mission Package 
MTI Moving Target Indicator 
NAVSSI Navigation Sensor System Interface 
NEP NLOS Engagement Planner 
NFCS Naval Fires Control System 
NLOS-LS Non-Line of Sight Launching System 
NSWC PHD  Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme 
Division 
PAM Precision Attack Missile 
PMI Proposed Military Improvement 
PSARE  Process for System Architecture and Requirements 
Engineering 
RAM Radar Absorbent Material 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
RF Radio Frequency 
SAL Semi-Active Laser 
SAR Ship Alteration Record 
SC Spectrum Certification 
SDD System Design and Development 
SFF Small Form-Factor  
SHIPALT Ship Alteration 
SM Spectrum Management 
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SM-2 Standard Missile-2 
STRIKE Strike Officer 
SuW Surface Warfare  
TLE Target Location Error 
TYCOM Type Commander 
UA Unit of Action 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
VLS Vertical Launching System 
WCS Weapon Control System 
WEPS Weapons Officer 
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